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Institutions, economic growth and international competitiveness: A regional study 
Roseline Wanjiru, Karla Prime 
 
Introduction 
Changes to global economic and financial markets pose significant challenges as well 
as opportunities for international business. Multinational firms seeking entry to new markets 
often consider rates of growth, local demand conditions as well as the institutional profiles of 
potential host-markets as part of strategic decision-making. Institutional uncertainties 
prevailing in many emerging markets present challenges for investors (Moser, Kuklinski, & 
Srivastava, 2017). The rise of new players from emerging markets as well as the growing trend 
by multinational firms to locate investment in diverse regions are two factors informed by 
differing levels of international competitiveness and economic performance across regions. 
Multiple studies on international competitiveness highlight the role of both micro and 
macro-level factors for international businesses. Michael Porter’s work (1998) investigating the 
nature of international competition and sources of competitive advantage identifies four key 
determinants of national competitiveness, namely; i) factor conditions; ii) demand conditions; 
iii) supporting and related industries and iv) firm strategy, structure and rivalry. This concept 
is further developed in a framework comprising three broad, interrelated drivers of foundational 
competitiveness as; i) social infrastructure and political institutions; ii) monetary and fiscal 
policy and iii) the microeconomic environment. These insights highlight the need for more 
detailed understanding of the conditions extant in different locations of international business, 
and the role of institutions within international competitiveness. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows present significant sources of investment to 
growing economies. Despite much of FDI circulating within developed economies, the share 
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of global flows going to developing economies is projected to rise.  Official cross-regional 
comparisons of FDI flows reveal the instability of investment flows to the Latin America and 
Caribbean region in recent times, a trend blamed on sustained economic recessions and 
uncertain macroeconomic and policy conditions in its economies (UNCTAD, 2017). Existing 
studies on this region focus predominantly on larger Latin American economies of Brazil, 
Chile, Peru and Colombia, to the exclusion of the multiple, less-prominent Caribbean 
economies. This study draws attention to these smaller, developing economies in this outlying 
region traditionally overlooked within mainstream IB studies. 
A search of relevant literature on regional competitiveness identified a dearth of studies 
examining the developing economies of the Caribbean. While a handful of studies generally 
considered the Caribbean region’s growth and competitiveness, these focused on specific 
sectors like agriculture (Hutchinson & Langham, 1999), tourism (Bolaky, 2011) or exchange-
rate volatility (Kandil, 2015). Among these limited studies, none had examined Caribbean 
competitiveness in terms of institutional quality or growth, despite the acknowledged negative 
impacts of policy uncertainty on growth and investment. This study therefore seeks to examine 
the role of institutions in the competitiveness and economic performance of Caribbean 
economies. 
Except for Belize (located in Central America), Guyana and Suriname (located in South 
America), the Caribbean economies are small island-states with an average land mass of 
404,850km2 (World Bank, 2017). These smaller economies share several similarities in addition 
to size and colonial heritage; being richly endowed with natural resources (bauxite, gold, oil 
and natural gas) and good weather most of the year. They additionally benefit from geographic 
proximity and good transport links to the richer North-American markets and substantial trade 
and travel connections with Europe. Majority of Caribbean exports go to the United States and 
the European Union under preferential trade agreements. Caribbean economies are 
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predominantly commodity exporters and service-based economies focused on tourism and 
financial services. Twenty Caribbean economies comprise the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), a regional grouping pursuing economic integration, joint foreign policy and 
security coordination and social development (Elliott, 2007; CARICOM, 2017).  
This chapter starts with an overview of economic performance and foreign investment 
in the Caribbean region and reviews existing literature on institutions and economic growth. 
The following section outlines the methods and data used to test for institutions shaping the 
Caribbean economies’ competitiveness and variances in economic growth. We test for the 
relationships between institutional quality and economic growth. Utilising the taxonomy 
devised by Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2004), this chapter then investigates the hierarchical 
impact that specific categories of institutions play within the performance of selected Caribbean 
economies. of the Caribbean, followed by a discussion of results and conclusion. 
 
Institutions, international competitiveness and economic performance  
 
Underlying the differences in economic performance of developing economies is a 
diversity of institutional frameworks prevalent in differing locations. Debates on national and 
international competitiveness assume the existence of particular institutional frameworks 
driving economic performance. However, the institutional landscape of most developing 
economies is heterogeneous. In particular, the persistence and quality of these institutions in 
developing economies differ significantly.  
Allocative views of growth emphasise the efficient distribution of available resources 
to support national and international competitiveness (Delgado, Ketels, Porter & Stern, 2012). 
Neoclassical perspectives support the existence of a positive and significant relationship 
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between factor endowments such as land, capital (human, physical and financial) and 
entrepreneurship as proximate causes of competitiveness and economic growth. Accordingly, 
poorer developing economies may appear to be precluded from economic growth as they 
generally lack the capital needed to effectively exploit allocation opportunities. Indeed, Latin 
American and Caribbean economies lag behind others on the productivity frontier (Fagerberg, 
Srholec & Knell, 2007; Castro-Gonzales, Pena-Vinces, & Guillen, 2016) and this may be the 
result of a combination of factors, including either factor endowments or their geography. 
Although a country’s factor endowments may explain its choice for different types of 
investment, it cannot explain the choice for the distribution of those resources (Engerman & 
Sokoloff, 2002). Those decisions are driven by the forms and function of the individual 
economy’s political and economic institutions.  
A system of well-defined and enforced institutions encourages trade and productive 
behaviour, by defining and providing predictability of individual and corporate behaviour. 
Institutions as ‘rules of the game’ arise as both political and economic governance solutions 
which determine the efficiency with which the proximate determinants are accumulated and 
distributed. They enable economic activity to be conducted in an environment of higher overall 




Political institutions determine the form and character of economic institutions and 
define how power in any society is obtained, used and controlled (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2005). 
They reflect the power relationship among the ruling elites. The varied collective choices taken 
by different economies reflect differences in their political institutions and differences in the 
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distribution of political power inherited from their colonial histories (Acemoglu & 
Robinson,2008). Political institutions that include “many” people in the governance process 
prevent abuse of the economic system (Acemoglu, Ticchi, & Vindigni, 2011). It is argued that 
sustained long-run economic growth requires ‘open access’ far-reaching political institutions 
that widen participation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2015). 
 
The central characteristic of a secure political system is one ‘credibly committed’ to 
preserving markets, through limiting political discretion over the economy and where the limits 
are self-enforcing (North, 1992; Williamson, 1998). Functional markets require institutions to 
govern political decision-making; form the basis for a rule of law, control of corruption and 
political choices. Any economic system must have secure political foundations limiting the 
state’s ability to confiscate wealth (Weingast, 1995; Rodrik, 2005).  
Therefore, economic growth is supported by economic institutions when political 
institutions create effective constraints on the executive, preventing them from monopolising 
the market through rent seeking (Farhadi et al., 2015). The emergence of economic institutions 
is consequently not an automatic process, but rather an endogenous process dependent on the 
evolution of political power and political institutions.  
 
Economic institutions 
Economic institutions perform key roles in enabling the effective functioning of 
markets. A taxonomy of four key economic institutions developed by Rodrik et al. (2004) 
categorises institutions into either; i) market-creating; ii) market-regulating; iii) market-
stabilising; and iv) market-legitimising institutions. This taxonomy provides a useful tool to 
examine the channels through which different types of institutions can impact economic 
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performance and thereby international competitiveness.  Each category of institutions attempts 
to strike an appropriate balance between disorder and dictatorship (Rodrik, 2005); however, 
this taxonomy does not create a hierarchical framework for the relative importance of each 
category of institutions. 
Market-creating institutions enable economic agents within an economy to interact, 
transact, and produce goods and services in the knowledge that economic profits from such 
activities is within their control (North, 1992; Rodrik, 2005; Das & Quirk, 2016). They protect 
rights and enforce contracts; in their absence, markets either perform poorly or fail to exist.  
Studies investigating market-creating institutions utilise assorted indicators as proxies. 
Rodrik et al. (2004) used the rule of law, while Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) used ‘executive 
constraint’ as a proxy for property rights institutions and legal formalism for contracting 
institutions in order to separately estimate their effects on long-run growth. Ideal proxies should 
capture the cost of enforcing private contracts as well as those institutions that define the 
relationship between the state and its subjects and provide the legal framework for the 
enforcement of private contracts. 
The second category of market-regulating institutions comprise the structures and 
arrangements that impose rules on markets to sustain long-run economic growth, while 
constraining market failures (Rodrik, 2005; Das & Quirk, 2016). Examples include regulatory 
agencies dealing with employment, financial services, telecommunication and transportation. 
Bhattacharyya (2009) used the EFW composite index of regulation in the credit market, labour 
market and business in general as a proxy of market-regulating institutions based on the 
assumption that they most closely reflect regulatory institutions. 
The third category, market-stabilising institutions are designed to enable markets to 
build resilience against shocks, reduce inflationary pressure, minimise macroeconomic 
volatility and avert financial crisis. These include institutions that regulate central banks, 
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exchange rate regimes, budgetary and fiscal rules and other regulations to minimise  
inflationary pressure and volatility in the long-run (Bhattacharyya, 2009). Institutions that 
impose fiscal constraints on the setting of interest rates or taxation on savings reduce 
uncertainty and encourage investment and other productive long-term behaviours. 
Finally, market-legitimising institutions serve to legitimise market outcomes. These are 
primarily concerned with the provision of social protection and insurance, redistribution and 
the management of social conflict in the event of shocks (Rodrik, 2005). These institutions are 
designed to minimise idiosyncratic risk to economic growth and employment, reducing the 
potential for market co-ordination failure among different factions within an economy. 
Democracy is used as a proxy for market-legitimising institutions based on the argument that a 
positive relationship exists between the effectiveness of democratic institutions and the quality 
of social insurance (Rodrik, 2005). Studies by Barro (1996); Tavares &Wacziarg (2001); 
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson & Yared (2005); Bhattacharyya (2009) use data from Polity IV 
democracy index as proxies for market-legitimising institutions as these measure the 
effectiveness of democratic institutions. 
Market-creating, market-legitimising, market-regulating and market-stabilising institutions 
should work effectively to align the interests of individual economic actors with those of the 
society to enhance or foster higher levels of productivity and output. 
 
 Institutions and international competitiveness 
Studies of international competitiveness have identified the role of macroeconomic 
factors such as the labour participation rates, access to capital and levels of technology in 
creating the opportunity for a developing country to mobilise working-age populations to 
increase productivity (Porter, Delgado, Ketels, & Stern, 2008). Delgado et al. (2012) define 
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competitiveness in terms of expected levels of output per working-age individual, supported by 
the overall quality of an economy as a place to do business. From this perspective, 
macroeconomic conditions such as national institutional structures set the framework of 
opportunities for productivity. More specifically, the quality of political institutions such as the 
rule of law and economic institutions that relate to business and labour regulation can enhance 
or inhibit productivity and consequently competitiveness.  
 
Empirical evidence supports the suggestion of a significant relationship between the 
quality of market-creating and market-legitimising institutions and levels of productivity 
including, the presence of property rights, the quality of governance and the impact of 
corruption. Market-stabilising institutions that control inflation levels contribute to the overall 
institutional infrastructures enabling productive economic activity. Similarly, market-
regulating institutions can either encourage or hinder anti-competitive behaviour among firms. 
Too little regulation may encourage anti-competitive behaviour while too much leads to red 
tape which increases transaction costs. Institutions therefore set the conditions under which 
these macroeconomic factors can be exploited for the purpose of increasing productivity and 
consequent levels of competitiveness. 
 
Institutions and economic growth 
Previous investigations into the importance of institutions for economic growth indicate 
strong evidence that property rights institutions are critical in determining economic growth 
(Barro, 1996; Rodrik et al., 2004).  Other interpretations conclude that factor endowments can 
only affect long-run economic outcomes through the economic institutions that determine their 
allocation (Easterly & Levine, 2003; Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005). Where property rights are 
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well enforced and secure, individual actors within the economy feel safe from expropriation of 
their resources (Auerbach & Azariadis, 2015). Rent-seeking activities or redistributive 
activities that take up resources can reduce innovation and hinder the rate of economic 
performance.  
 Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) distinguish between contracting institutions and property 
rights institutions at the macro level, arguing that while contracting institutions regulate 
transactions between private parties, property rights institutions are intimately linked to the 
distribution of political power in a society as they regulate the relationship between ordinary 
citizens and the politicians or elites with access to political power. When property rights are 
weak, they fail to constrain those who control the State. This problem cannot be circumvented 
through writing alternative contracts between private parties to prevent future expropriation, as 
the state has a monopoly of legitimate violence which it uses to maintain and exercise power. 
 
An early study in this area investigated fifty-five countries between 1972-95 and found 
that even though developing countries took longer to achieve institutional development, their 
economic institutions had a greater influence on economic growth. At the same time, economic 
growth had a positive relationship with improvements of institutional quality (Chong & 
Calderon, 2000). Subsequent studies have focused on different countries and regions; (such as 
Klomp &de Haan (2009); Haggard &Tiede (2010); Narayan, Narayan &Smyth (2011); Fatás 
& Mihov (2013); Flachaire, García-Peñalosa &Konte (2014); Nawaz (2015). These studies 




However, conflicting studies such as Commander & Nikoloski (2011) and Dias & 
Tebaldi (2012) find only limited evidence of a robust link between political institutions and 
economic growth. These contradictory results suggest that some economies may develop 
effective institutions for economic growth while others struggle to achieve these. Accordingly, 
it is necessary to empirically investigate these links in a range of contexts. This chapter 
contributes to this ongoing debate by investigating which institutions influence growth and 
international competitiveness in the Caribbean.  
 
Reviewing economic performance and foreign investment in the Caribbean region 
Economic performance and FDI flows to the Caribbean economies in recent times have 
been mixed, reflecting the diversity across individual countries. On average, FDI accounts for 
ten per cent of the total GDP for small-island economies (UNCTAD, 2017). Prior to the 2008 
recession, the fastest growing CARICOM economies (Trinidad & Tobago, Belize, Suriname, 
Antigua & Barbuda and St. Kitts & Nevis) grew at rates above three per cent annually between 
2000-09 while moderate rates of above two per cent were recorded for St. Lucia, Dominica, 
Bermuda and Grenada. The Bahamas, Barbados and Guyana grew on average at one per cent. 
Slow growth was recorded for The Cayman Islands at an average of zero percent, Haiti at 0.7 
per cent and Jamaica at 0.9 per cent average annual growth rates respectively (World Bank, 
2017). Post-recession, Caribbean economies have recorded mixed economic performances as 
summarised in the table below.  
 
***TABLE 5.1 ABOUT HERE*** 
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Caribbean economies remain highly vulnerable to global shocks as a result of their 
reliance on global commodity trades and tourism. Commodity exporters such as Guyana, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago depend on revenues from oil and gas, minerals and 
agricultural goods. Commodity exporters initially benefitted from rising global commodity 
prices pre-recession while service-dependent economies like The Bahamas and Barbados 
received declining tourism numbers post-recession (De Groot & Pérez Ludeña, 2014). 
Additionally, this region’s geographic location exposes individual countries (e.g. Haiti, 
Grenada) to external shocks from natural disasters. 
From 1990-2010, the top Caribbean destinations for FDI were the British Virgin Islands 
and the Cayman Islands which act as offshore financial centres attracting significant amounts 
of FDI (UNCTAD, 2017). However, the performance of these two states is not typical of the 
region and both states are not full members of the CARICOM. A more representative 
performance of FDI flows to this region is summarised in the graph below outlining the top five 
host-countries; 
 
***FIGURE 5.1 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
Post-recession, FDI inflows to the Caribbean (excluding offshore financial centres) have 
declined by nine per cent. The largest FDI recipients in 2015 were Dominica Republic 
(US$2,221 million), Trinidad and Tobago (US$1,619 million), Jamaica (US$794 million), 
Bahamas (US$385 million) and Barbados (US$254 million) (UNCTAD, 2017).  
The declining performance is explained by, inter alia, macroeconomic and policy 
uncertainty. Individual economies have undertaken a range of reforms to enhance their 
attractiveness to foreign investment. Incentives and concessions offered to foreign investors in 
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developing economies elsewhere such as subsidised rates, tax breaks or reduced regulatory 
burdens (Phelps, Stillwell & Wanjiru, 2009) are evident but the results on economic growth are 
mixed. Reforms adpted in Bahamas and Barbados have resulted in increased FDI flows (World 
Bank, 2017). Conversely, while IMF-backed reforms in Guyana appeared to spur economic 
growth pre-recession, FDI flows have gradually declined. Guyana’s structural weaknesses, an 
oversized government, inefficient bureaucracy and significant restrictions on foreign 
investment may explain this slow growth.  
Export-led growth models pursued successfully elsewhere reveal gradually declining 
reliance on FDI; in contrast, the domestic demand-driven growth models pursued in the 
Caribbean region rely on their ability to attract international investment (de la Torre, 
Pienknagura, & Levy Yeyati, 2013). Inflows to this region are driven partly by rising internal 
demand and the privatisation and liberalisation programmes undertaken in key sectors 
(telecommunications, electricity, natural resources, financial services, tourism). Understanding 
the role of domestic institutions and the links to growth is therefore central to enhancing this 




We utilise data for ten CARICOM Members for which data for the period 1990-2014 is 
readily available. These Caribbean economies are ranked as high-income (Bahamas, Barbados 
and Trinidad and Tobago), upper middle-income (Suriname) and lower-income (Dominica, 
Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and St. Lucia) based on gross national 
income (GNI) per capita revised as of July 1, 2016 (World Bank, 2017). The study is guided 
by two central research questions focused on economic performance and institutional quality.  
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Testing variance in the Caribbean region’s economic performance 
The first question examines the impact of proximate determinants, and specifically the 
impact of total factor productivity (TFP), on capital accumulation and labour productivity. An 
augmented Cobbs-Douglas growth accounting exercise decomposes economic performance, 
proxied by GDP per capita (Solow, 1994). Solow considers TFP to be a completely independent 
exogenous process, even though he does not address how technical progress is accelerated. 
Romer (1994) views economic performance as a measure of the combination of labour and 
capital and the counterbalance of ‘good’ institutions.   
Technical progress is considered the result of improved and new ways of accomplishing 
traditional tasks. Neutral technological progress occurs where an economy experiences 
increases in output levels with no increase in TFP and no change in the combination of factor 
inputs. Alternatively, TFP that results in savings on labour inputs is considered labour-saving 
technical progress (Solow, 1994). Capital-saving TFP, although considered a rarer 
phenomenon, is the result of low-cost, efficient, labour-intensive techniques of production.   
 
While the productive capacity of an economy is commonly described through use of 
aggregate production functions, the results should be cautiously interpreted. TFP not only 
measures technical progress, but captures the effects of myriad other determinants of efficient 
factor usage (government policy, political unrest and even weather shocks). It would be near-
impossible to isolate individual determinants within the production function model as the 
results highlight proximate causes of economic growth but not the underlying fundamental 
determinants (Hall & Jones, 1999; Barrell, Holland, & Liadze, 2010). Secondly, the Solow 
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model does not explain the differences in technical progress across countries with similar 
technologies.  
The following Cobbs-Douglas specification is assumed for all economies in the dataset: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼                                                        (1) 
For the each time period t: 
Y = GDP per capita (PPP) (constant 2011 
international $) 
K= Capital stock (2011 US$)  
L= Total employment 
A= TFP 
α= Output elasticity of capital 
1-α= Output elasticity of labour 
  
 
The mean wage-share of CARICOM over 1990-2014 was used as guidance for the 
estimate of 1-α which gives a value of 0.45 & a 0.55 for α.  While 1-α may deviate somewhat 
from the imposed mean coefficient for individual CARICOM Member economies, such 
differences should not utterly bias the potential output results. Y values and L values were taken 
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017). K was collected from Penn World 
Tables (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2015). To calculate TFP for each year we use the 
following derivative of equation (2): 
𝐴𝑡 =  𝑌𝑡 −  𝐾𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡                                                     (2) 
Table 5.2 summarises the growth accounting results. The first row shows each country’s 
output growth. Over 1990-2014, Suriname experienced an annual average growth of two per 
cent, Haiti and Trinidad & Tobago each experienced an average of one per cent annual growth 
in labour.  Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, St. Vincent and St. Lucia experienced stagnated 
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growth at less than one per cent.  Dominica and Grenada exhibited negative labour force growth 
over the period (-3.76 per cent and -3.5 per cent respectively). These results may be attributed 
to the stagnant 2 per cent average growth rate of the working age population in these economies 
during this period; this is indicative of a capital-intensive economy, requiring greater 
investment in capital than skilled or unskilled labour. 
 
***TABLE 5.2 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
Extensive economic is generally considered unsustainable (Hall & Jones, 1999; Barrell 
et al., 2010) as it relies heavily on investment in capital stock and labour. Similarly, a negative 
TFP (the Bahamas -2.31 per cent, Barbados -2.10 per cent, Haiti -2.99 per cent, St. Lucia -0.96 
per cent and Suriname -1.31 per cent) could be evidence of inefficient use of the labour force, 
misallocation of resources, failure to meet consumer demands and inefficient economy (Hall & 
Jones, 1999).  Barbados and Haiti’s low rate of growth (0.81 per cent and 0.78 per cent 
respectively) is indicative of economies heavily dependent on capital (2.62 per cent and 2.42 
per cent respectively). The negative TFP coupled with increased capital and labour utilisation 
exhibited in Suriname indicates performance that may lead to economic contraction.  
 
Testing for institutional quality 
The second research question investigates the relationship between institutional quality 
and economic performance. For this, institutional observations for the same period were 
collected from the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index computed by Gwartney, 
Lawson, and Hall (2016). EFW ranks the degree to which policies and institutions are 
supportive of economic freedom. Data from EFW has been used in multiple studies examining 
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the impact of economic freedom on investment, economic growth, income levels and poverty 
rates (Le, 2009; Góes, 2016).  
 
In line with existing studies, an expectation-maximisation (EM) algorithm utilising an 
iterative method was used to find the maximum likelihood estimates of missing values (Siddiqui 
& Ahmed, 2013) yielding 100 observations per country (Table 5.3). To reduce the institutional 
variables into fewer significant components, common factor analysis (‘CFA’) was used to 
isolate the underlying correlation of institutional quality indicators and explain variance with 
the fewest components (Siddiqui & Ahmed, 2013).  
 
***TABLE 5.3 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Utilising the Kaiser criterion (1960) the top four components were retained. The data 
was orthogonally rotated using varimax method. After rotation, the first component explained 
on average 37 per cent of the total retained variance and the remaining three components 
explained 25 per cent, 20 per cent and 17 per cent respectively. The four components are 
interpreted through the correlation between observed variables and components; higher 
loadings mean that the indicator is more relevant in defining the component. The components 
were classified as Market-Creating (MC), Market-Regulating (MR), Market-Legitimising (ML) 
and Market-Stabilising (MS) (summarised in Table 5.4).  
 
*** TABLE 5.4 ABOUT HERE*** 
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Description and analysis of institutional indices 
INST is an aggregate index of the four institutional factors. Market-regulating factor 
was the largest contributor to INST (37 per cent), followed by market-legitimising (25 per cent), 
market-stabilising (20 per cent) and market-creating (17 per cent) institutions respectively.   
The primary objective of Market-creating institutions is providing the basis for 
exchange, lowering transaction costs and facilitating economic growth.  In this investigation 
CFA has identified that the major weights in this factor come from legal enforcement of 
contracts, hiring and minimum wage regulations, hours’ regulations and starting a business.  
Market-regulating institutions provide an element of economies of scale that can 
increase the cost of enforcing market-creating institutions, making private protection of 
property rights expensive and inefficient.  Indicators that were strongly related to this factor 
include judicial independence, reliability of police, cost of tariffs, ownership of banks, hiring 
and firing regulations, centralised collective bargaining, bureaucracy costs, licensing 
restrictions and government effectiveness.  
Indicators that weighted strongly as Market-legitimising factor included extra 
payments/bribes/favouritism derived from ‘Business Regulations’ sub-index of EFW.  These 
measure the perceptions of the quality of equity within the economic system, in particular equity 
of government officials when deciding policies and contracts.   
The indicators that weighed strongly on Market-stabilising factor included regulatory 
restrictions on the sale of real property, non-tariff trade barriers, mandated cost of worker 
dismissal and foreign ownership investment restrictions. Market-stabilising not only target 
inflation or impose government enforcement of fiscal actions; They reduce uncertainty, 




Testing for the relationship between institutional quality and economic performance 
To test the relationship between institutions and economic growth, this study followed 
a specification based on Barro (1991), Delgado et al. (2012) and Siddiqui and Ahmed (2013) 
which draw on empirical studies by Solow (1956);Lucas Jr. (1988) and North (1994) that 
confirm evidence of conditional convergence on input factors, some of which are related to 
institutions.   
The specification used below: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (3)  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡  = GDP per capita (PPP) (constant 2011 international $) 
𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 
= 
 Lagged macroeconomic covariate comprised of capital and total 
employment 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡= Institutional sub-indices 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = TFP as a ‘black box’ of other determinants of efficiency of factor 
usage 
 
Year dummies are included in the model to control for fixed time specific effects. Table 
5.5 summarises the descriptive statistics for this data. Equation (3) is interested with the effect 
of MACRO and INST on national output, controlled for by TFP and fixed time specific effects. 
Each variable is measured differently, therefore, the standardised regression coefficients are 
used to compare the magnitude of their effects.  
 
***TABLE 5.5 ABOUT HERE*** 
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Following Delgado et al. (2012) the dependent variable is measured by the log of GDP 
per capita. It provides a measure of the potential for productivity of labour and capital.  Average 
annual inflation rates for the Caribbean economies over the 25-year test period average 5.64 
per cent, with standard deviations of 16.5 points respectively (World Bank, 2017). 
 
Adverse labour market institutions are expected to have a negative influence on long-
run economic growth, through increased unemployment. Developing economies are 
characterised by higher levels of unemployment and the absence of unemployment insurance, 
limited access to social security and welfare support and lower levels of income. These 
institutional factors suggest that the added worker effect is likely to be stronger for developing 
Caribbean economies. 
 
Empirical results and discussion 
 
Table 5.6 presents results of the model on the relationship between economic 
performance and the individual categories of macroeconomic and institutional factors, 
controlling for TFP.  Model 1 examines the relationship of the macroeconomic environment.  
We find that capital has a growth limiting effect on GDP per capita, but no evidence of a 
significant relationship between the proximate determinants and economic performance.   
 
***TABLE 5.6 ABOUT HERE*** 
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Models 2-7 examine the individual influence of institutional factors on GDP per capita. 
The results indicate the existence of a robust relationship between MR, ML and MS and GDP 
per capita. The negative coefficient for MS suggests that these institutions have a growth 
maximising level effect on GDP per capita.  The negative but significant relationship could be 
due to the restraint of parallel informal institutions which may occur as their quality increases 
and the market adjusts against external shocks.  The parallel informal institutions make it easier 
for economic actors to conduct business within the complex bureaucratic regulations of an 
economy.  Their systematic erosion with the introduction of more regulation may create 
inefficiencies, bureaucracy and increase the cost of transactions.  
 
These results are also robust to substituting the aggregated institutional index INST 
(Model 7).  The results validate INST and suggest that our findings are not driven by potential 
bias in any one institutional index.  
 
Model 1-10 provides evidence that MR, ML and MS institutions become significant 
influencers on national output and attractiveness of these small-island economies for 
international investment. This would suggest that endowments that may be captured by TFP 
have separate effects on levels of economic performance. On average a standard deviation 
increase in capital is associated with approximately 23 per cent decrease in GDP per capita.  
This is significantly less than the effect of labour mobilisation, where an average standard 
deviation increase is associated with a 32 per cent increase in GDP per capita. Similarly, on 
average a standard deviation increase in TFP is associated with a decrease of less than one per 




That institutions are important for economic growth is not in dispute.  However, earlier 
empirical studies have not identified which institutions matter most or how they matter for 
economic growth.  This study investigated this issue in the small-island developing economies 
of the Caribbean.  It presented a sub-index of institutions for the period 1990-2014 as measures 
of institutions.  These indices captured the effect of market-creating, market-regulating, market-
stabilising and market-legitimising institutions, in a formal model alongside macroeconomic 
variables on economic performance and international competitiveness.  There is evidence that 
those institutions designed to regulate and legitimise the market, impose roles within the market 
and constrain inefficiencies have a significant impact on levels of productivity. However, there 
is also evidence that market-stabilising institutions have a growth-maximising level beyond 
which increased bureaucracy can kill the incentive for investment and productivity. These 
findings suggest that strengthening market-legitimising and market-regulating institutions is 
crucial for these developing Caribbean economies, whether high-, middle- or lower-income, to 
promote economic growth and international competitiveness. 
  These results also indicate that in the absence of controls for TFP, institutions that focus 
on the measure of political participation and target external shocks have a significant impact on 
output levels.  It would suggest that holding proximate determinants constant, productivity in 
these Caribbean economies is reliant on the control of inflation, self-imposed government 
enforcement of fiscal policies, integrity of the legal system, control of corruption and political 
stability.  
This study contributes to existing literature on the competitiveness of host economies 
within international business, with a focus on developing countries and the overlooked 
Caribbean region. Results from this study build upon existing work and move the discussion 
beyond property rights and contracts. In line with existing literature, we confirm that institutions 
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play a role in the economic performance of the selected economies. Interestingly, the results 
indicate that specific institutions play varying roles within this region’s economies. Different 
categories of institutions appear to matter more than others for growth and international 
competitiveness; we find differences in the impact of market-regulating institutions compared 
to market-stabilising institutions in this region’s economies. Specifically, market-stabilising 
institutions appear to have a growth-maximising level beyond that which increased red-tape 
and bureaucracy would kill the incentive for investment.   
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Figure 5.1 Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to the Top Five Host Countries of the 
Caribbean 
(1990–2014 Annual, US$ Millions) 
 
Source: Compiled using data from UNCTAD (2017) 
 
 
Table 5.1 CARICOM Member-states Annual GDP Growth (%) for Period 1990-2015 
Country Name 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2015 
Antigua and Barbuda 3.31 3.30 0.43 
Bahamas, The 1.64 1.00 -0.10 
Barbados 0.47 1.42 0.19 
Belize 5.77 4.94 2.57 
Bermuda 1.89 2.71 -1.37 
Cayman Islands 5.31 0.00 0.00 
Dominica 2.28 2.51 1.74 
Grenada 3.51 2.18 1.77 
Guyana 4.79 1.97 4.10 
Haiti 2.53 0.77 1.92 
Jamaica 2.16 0.93 -0.10 
St. Kitts and Nevis 4.06 3.22 2.18 
St. Lucia 5.51 2.53 0.61 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3.40 3.45 0.85 
Suriname 0.69 4.47 3.46 
Trinidad and Tobago 3.95 6.52 1.61 
 
























Table 5.2 Sources of Growth – Annual Percentage Rate of Change 




Growth Capital Labour TFP 
The Bahamas 1.24 2.59 0.97 -2.31 
Barbados 0.81 2.62 0.29 -2.10 
Dominica* 1.68 1.38 -3.76 4.06 
Grenada+ 3.51 3.44 -3.50 3.57 
Haiti 0.78 2.42 1.35 -2.99 
Jamaica 1.27 0.85 0.34 0.08 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2.77 2.20 0.54 0.03 
St. Lucia 3.12 3.18 0.90 -0.96 
Suriname 2.79 2.00 2.10 -1.31 
Trinidad and Tobago 4.44 0.22 1.22 3.01 
 
* Data only available for the period 1990–2002. 
+ Data only available for the period 1990–99. 
Source: Authors estimates, data from World Bank (2017) 
 
 
Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Institutional Quality Data Observations 
 Count Mean Min Max St. Dev 
 Judicial independence 100 -0.133 -2.191 1.960 0.889 
 Impartial courts 100 0.222 -1.281 1.707 0.842 
 Military interference in rule of law and politics 100 0.181 -2.431 1.233 0.840 
 Integrity of the legal system 100 0.214 -1.641 1.747 0.869 
 Legal enforcement of contracts 100 0.408 -1.450 3.655 1.141 
 Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property 100 -0.279 -2.083 2.439 0.832 
 Reliability of police 100 0.113 -1.563 1.962 0.723 
 Tariffs 100 -0.091 -2.421 1.123 0.993 
 Compliance costs of importing and exporting 100 0.416 -2.910 2.322 0.801 
 Non-tariff trade barriers 100 -0.417 -3.502 2.035 1.123 
 Ownership of banks 100 -0.018 -1.130 0.750 0.841 
 Private sector credit 100 0.130 -2.852 1.507 0.873 
 Interest rate controls/negative real interest rates 100 0.132 -3.123 0.665 0.836 
 Hiring regulations and minimum wage 100 -0.182 -4.608 1.915 1.124 
 Hiring and firing regulations 100 0.185 -2.361 1.789 0.830 
 Centralised collective bargaining 100 0.449 -2.721 1.937 0.971 
 Hours regulations 100 -0.079 -2.665 1.154 0.914 
 Mandated cost of worker dismissal 100 -0.026 -2.878 1.773 0.985 
 Bureaucracy costs 100 0.335 -2.024 3.174 0.975 
 Starting a business 100 -0.400 -4.788 1.319 1.192 
 Extra payments/bribes/favouritism 100 0.200 -1.485 1.941 0.802 
 Licensing restrictions 100 -0.210 -2.111 1.654 0.929 
 Tax compliance 100 0.212 -1.730 1.786 0.930 
 Control of Corruption 100 0.226 -1.363 1.466 0.899 
 Government effectiveness 100 0.202 -2.344 1.582 0.913 
 Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 100 0.228 -1.523 1.851 0.895 
 Foreign ownership investment restrictions 100 0.074 -1.974 2.124 0.840 
 Capital controls 100 -0.233 -1.009 1.560 0.841 
 





Table 5.4 Results of Common Factor Analysis of Institutional Indicators 






Factor Loadings after rotation* 
(Weights and correlations between each variable and the factor) 
 Judicial independence -0.062 106% -0.034 -3% -0.481 109% -0.162 1145% -0.178 
 Impartial courts 0.000 -1% 0.044 4% 0.032 -7% 0.019 -137% 0.028 
 Military interference in rule of law 
and politics 0.005 -9% 0.001 0% 0.004 -1% 0.034 -238% 0.009 
 Integrity of the legal system 0.002 -3% 0.032 3% 0.041 -9% 0.072 -512% 0.037 
 Legal enforcement of contracts -0.535 911% 0.113 10% 0.227 -52% 0.285 -2019% 0.064 
 Regulatory restrictions on the sale of 
real property -0.052 89% -0.012 -1% -0.149 34% -0.318 2255% -0.116 
 Reliability of police -0.012 20% 0.061 6% -0.185 42% -0.166 1178% -0.060 
 Tariffs -0.004 7% -0.075 -7% -0.128 29% -0.037 260% -0.068 
 Compliance costs of importing and 
exporting -0.003 5% 0.010 1% -0.015 3% -0.015 104% -0.004 
 Non-tariff trade barriers 0.002 -4% -0.021 -2% -0.003 1% 0.100 -708% 0.012 
 Ownership of banks 0.001 -1% 0.003 0% 0.043 -10% 0.001 -4% 0.012 
 Private sector credit 0.000 -1% -0.002 0% 0.020 -5% 0.012 -87% 0.007 
 Interest rate controls/negative real 
interest rates 0.003 -5% 0.018 2% -0.007 2% -0.036 252% -0.002 
 Hiring regulations and minimum 
wage 0.395 
-
673% 0.086 8% 0.031 -7% 0.252 -1788% 0.159 
 Hiring and firing regulations 0.012 -21% 0.034 3% 0.100 -23% -0.026 184% 0.035 
 Centralised collective bargaining 0.000 0% 0.009 1% 0.071 -16% 0.029 -206% 0.027 
 Hours regulations 0.009 -16% 0.002 0% 0.001 0% -0.007 47% 0.001 
 Mandated cost of worker dismissal 0.043 -74% 0.121 11% 0.020 -5% -0.316 2236% -0.007 
 Bureaucracy costs 0.002 -4% 0.005 0% 0.052 -12% -0.014 102% 0.012 
 Starting a business 
0.067 
-
114% 0.006 1% 0.033 -8% 0.066 -465% 0.036 
 Extra payments/bribes/favouritism -0.023 39% 0.009 1% -0.054 12% 0.057 -404% -0.003 
 Licensing restrictions -0.007 13% 0.011 1% 0.062 -14% -0.099 700% -0.002 
 Tax compliance 0.009 -15% 0.018 2% 0.026 -6% 0.002 -15% 0.015 
 Control of Corruption 
0.060 
-
102% 0.458 42% -0.041 9% -0.016 115% 0.166 
 Government effectiveness 0.013 -23% 0.076 7% -0.093 21% 0.130 -922% 0.033 
 Political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism 0.027 -46% 0.168 16% -0.108 24% -0.138 974% 0.011 
 Foreign ownership investment 
restrictions -0.006 10% -0.029 -3% 0.043 -10% 0.190 -1349% 0.038 
 Capital controls -0.007 11% -0.034 -3% 0.019 -4% 0.084 -597% 0.008 
 
Source: Author calculations 
Factors extracted using Common Factor Analysis method.  Rotation performed using varimax method with Kaiser 
normalisation.  
*Weights based on amount of variance explained by each factor in proportion to the total variance explained by 







Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Variables 
 Obs  Mean Min Max St. Dev. 
Capital 254  0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.01 
Labour 221  0.01 -0.45 0.29 0.05 
TFP 221  0.00 -0.27 0.51 0.06 
GDP per capita, PPP* 244  13204.13 1502.03 31951.02 7118.96 
 









GDP per Capita 
          
model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6 model7 model8 model9 model10 
Macroeconomic           
Capital -0.226 -0.536 0.348 -0.333 0.131 0.311 0.007 -0.187 -0.209 -0.240 
 (0.190) (0.393) (0.597) (0.440) (0.468) (0.409) (0.478) (0.137) (0.166) (0.161) 
Labour 0.324 0.437 0.115 -1.444 1.063 1.148 -0.648 -0.248 -1.020 -0.109 
 (0.913) (1.192) (1.938) (1.676) (1.745) (1.504) (1.872) (0.669) (0.696) (0.101) 
Endowments           
TFP 0.060 -0.333 0.081 0.055 -0.319 -0.047 -0.013 0.108 -0.081  
 (0.221) (0.210) (0.301) (0.251) (0.338) (0.243) (0.289) (0.171) (0.158)  
Institutional sub-indices          
ML  0.611*   0.910*    0.491** 0.435** 
  (0.271)   (0.425)    (0.171) (0.155) 
MS  -0.904***    -0.916**   -0.259* -0.252* 
  (0.186)    (0.249)   (0.109) (0.108) 
MC  -0.516* 0.279      0.035 0.055 
  (0.224) (0.333)      (0.141) (0.140) 
MR  0.680**  0.733**     0.670*** 0.629*** 
  (0.181)  (0.225)     (0.138) (0.134) 
INST       0.948    
       (0.503)    
constant -0.439 -1.111 0.019 -0.864 0.625 -0.610 -0.064 -0.424** -0.401* -0.404** 
 (0.734) (0.815) (1.224) (0.967) (1.150) (0.917) (1.088) (0.150) (0.150) (0.149) 
N 78 51 51 51 51 51 51 78 51 52 
Year fixed 
effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO 
r2 0.169 0.790 0.231 0.465 0.344 0.509 0.317 0.036 0.486 0.464 
ar2 -0.279 0.448 -0.747 -0.217 -0.492 -0.117 -0.552 -0.003 0.4861 0.392 
df_r 50.000 19.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 22.000 74.000 43.000 45.000 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Source: Author calculations 
 
